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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970's, the amount of environmental regulation at all levels of government has
increased significantly. Major federal statutes include the Clean Air Act, Federal Water
Pollution Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Toxic Substances Control Act
(ToSCA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA). In addition, states have their own environmental laws and regulations. The
resulting web of often highly technical requirements makes it difficult for even the regulated
enterprise itself to know whether it is in compliance with applicable law. In response, many
firms have instituted a policy of conducting their own "environmental audits.1"
Despite the increased incidence of such audits many commentators have suggested that the
practice is still far rarer than it should be.2 Self-auditing is regarded as more thorough and
efficient than periodic audits by the regulator. Yet, firms are reportedly reluctant to conduct such
audits for fear that the information they gather on compliance problems will be obtained by the
government and/or adverse private parties (presumably through discovery, subpoena or whistle-
blowing) and used against them in a subsequent proceeding. By carefully investigating their own
compliance status, the argument goes, firms are effectively aiding in their own prosecution
and/or adverse suit.3
1
 See, e.g., Kirsch and Viers (1996).
2
 See, e.g., Cooney et. al. (1995c) ("Environmental auditing is not used as frequently as it should be, however, due
in part to governmental reluctance to give formal protection to internal documents generated during the audit
process.")
3
 See, e.g., ibid, and Moore and Newkirk (1995), ("Substantial disincentives to self evaluation have existed because
of enforcement risk associated with penalties imposed when noncompliance is found and reported and the fear that
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Since 1986 the EPA has taken a series of tentative steps to address this concern, cumulating
in a December 1995 "Policy Guideline.4" Reduced to its essential economic content, the
guideline lowers fines5 for firms that discover violations through a program of self-auditing, so
long as the firm voluntarily discloses these violations and then promptly corrects the problem.
Industry sentiment is that the EPA policy does not go far enough and legislation is now pending
in Congress which would provide more sweeping protections. Stronger protections have in fact
already been passed in several states, notably Oregon and Colorado.6 More than ten states7 in all
have enacted into law some form of evidentiary "audit privilege" for the information revealed by
self-audit;8 others also offer immunity for harms discovered and fixed.
The question of how best to treat self-auditing is in essence a two-tiered incentive problem.
As in the usual torts problem,9 the primary concern is inducing firms to take appropriate levels of
"environmental care" through a system of fines or charges probabilistically applied via random
and imperfect auditing. But in a technically and legally complicated regulatory regime, it is also
necessary to induce firms to carefully figure out whether, where and how to apply that care
effort. The difficulty, according to all reports, is that such self-investigation effectively improves
the regulator's own auditing system and so increases the frequency that fines used to induce care
effort will be assessed.
the information will be used against the company."). Feeley (1995) ("A self-audit can become a 'prosecutorial road




 Through both the explicit reduction of the "gravity" component of civil fines and the (non-binding) promise not to
prosecute based on self-discovered violations.
6
 See, e.g. Kirsch and Viers (1996).
7
 These are Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oregon, Utah, Virginia,
Wyoming. At least 25 other states have considered similar legislation.
This paper applies the existing legal/economic analysis of torts to the two-tiered incentive
issued raised by the self-auditing issue. We find that conventional tort remedies based on harm
and/or "care" (strict liability and negligence with punitive add-ons to reflect the possibility that
firms are not caught in violation) fail to produce the socially optimal amount of self-auditing. To
fix the problem we propose that punitive fines be reduced for firms that conduct their own
investigation. This echoes Arlen's (1994) earlier findings with respect to corporate criminal
liability. (See also the contemporaneous, Arlen and Kraakman (1997)).
Importantly, we suggest this reduction be made regardless of whether the firm voluntarily
discloses the results of its investigation, and indeed regardless of whether the firm has chosen to
fix the problems it finds. This is in marked contrast to the EPA policy now in effect, which holds
voluntary disclosure and corrective action as preconditions for fine reduction; and which,
through additional criminal prosecution based in part on a knowledge element,10 essentially
punish the firm more when it knows of an unfixed problem than when it is ignorant.
We also consider whether making fines contingent on voluntary disclosure (rather than on
investigation directly) could be used to correctly align the incentives for self-auditing. We find
that the answer is yes, but only to the extent that fine reductions for disclosure may be used to
effectively condition fines on investigation (this is explained within). Again in contrast to EPA
policy, this requires, among other things, that fine reduction for disclosed violation not be made
contingent on whether the violation was corrected.
8
 There is general agreement among legal scholars that traditional privileges (including attorney client, work product
and the self-evaluative privilege) fail to cover this case.
9
 See, e.g. Shavell (1980) and Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988).
10
 Note, however, that the usual "knowledge" requirement is generally not as strict for environmental crimes. See,
e.g. Cooney et. al. (1995b).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sketches a simple model. Section 3 starts by
identifying the socially optimal solution to the two-tiered choice of investigation and fixing. It
turns next to the failure of conventional strict liability and negligence rules to attain this
optimum. Next, it proposes a solution involving conditioning fines on investigation. Lastly, it
shows that if investigation is verifiable, it is possible to obtain effectively the same solution by
conditioning on disclosure of investigation rather than investigation itself.
2. A SIMPLE MODEL
A firm is uncertain about the amount of environmental harm h that its operation in the
current (and only) period will cause. It is uncertain about both the magnitude and nature of this
harm. Without understanding the nature of the harm, the firm cannot take corrective action. Its
beliefs over magnitude are given by the probability measure P.
In order to discover the magnitude and nature of the harm the firm must conduct an
environmental self-audit (henceforth an "investigation"). We assume that the firm decides only
whether or not to investigate, not how much or how to investigate. We also assume that if the
firm investigates it learns with certainty both the magnitude and nature of the harm. It costs the
firm i to investigate.
If the firm chooses to investigate, it then decides whether or not to fix the problem(s) that it
finds. The fixing decision is also binary and if the firm fixes the problem there is no residual
harm. The cost of alleviating the harm depends on the magnitude of the harm and is denoted ch.
Left to itself, the firm will neither investigate nor fix since these are costly actions and it
does not care about the harm it is causing. The second actor in our model, a regulatory agency,
considers not only private costs, but also the harm itself. With some probability depending on
the harm itself, the agency learns the magnitude and nature of the harm caused by the firm. In
accord with rationales presented in the popular press for special treatment of voluntary
disclosure,11 we assume that this probability is always larger if the firm has itself investigated.
Perhaps the existence of a "paper trail" makes it more likely that, conditional on auditing, the
agency learns of the harm. If the firm has investigated, the probability that the government
learns the harm is ph. If it has not, the probability is p < Ph.n
3. CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
We begin by characterizing what investigation and fixing decisions the regulatory agency
would make if it controlled the firm. We then consider alternative fine structures that the agency
might use in order to align private incentives with public interest.13 These analyses are presented
in two steps, working backwards: first the decision to fix, conditional upon having investigated,
is considered; next the initial decision to investigate is analyzed.
11
 See footnote 3, supra.
12
 These probabilities are a composite of 1) the probability that the regulatory agency audits the firm and 2) given
that the agency has audited, the probability that the agency finds the harm. We abstract from the possibility that the
agency either finds only part of the harm or overstates the harm. If it finds harm at all, it finds the right level.
13
 In fact we are considering only a sub-problem of a more general social welfare problem. In principle, the optimal
probabilities of government spot-auditing would be derived from a model in which the government cost of spot-
auditing and the firms cost of self-auditing were included. Here we take these probabilities as exogenously given
and focus on the issue of how fines should be structured.
3.1 Society's Problem
What contingent plan for investigation and fixing is optimal for society? Having
investigated and found harm of magnitude h, fixing is a best choice if and only if
ch<h. (1)
This produces an optimal fixing decision contingent on h. Given this best contingent plan,
investigation imposes expected social costs of
jchdP + \hdP (2)
harms that are best fixed harms that are best not fixed
On the other hand, not investigating imposes expected social costs of
\hdP (3)
Combining (2) and (3), it is best for society to investigate if and only if
i < jh-ch dP. (4)
direct costs ch<h
benefits
The social costs of investigation (as we do the accounting here) are the direct costs i of
conducting the search for harm. The social benefits are the savings (h-ch) in all the cases where
we fix, having discovered the harm (i.e. all h with ch<h).
In order for our firm to make the optimal decision for society we must employ a fine
structure that induces the firm to make the decision to fix, having investigated, according to (1)
and the decision to investigate according to (4).
3.2 Conventional Strict liability
We consider first a policy of strict liability (with additional punitive damages to account for
the probability that the firm is not caught). While this can succeed (unsurprisingly) in giving the
firm the right incentives to fix conditional upon having investigated, we find that it results in too
little investigation. As we clarify below, there are in fact two distinct distortions to the
investigation decision (given that incentives in the post-investigation fixing decision are correctly
aligned). The first is born from the fact that investigation increases the probability of being fined
should the firm choose not to fix the harm that it finds. The second is due to the firm's
undervaluing the benefits of investigating in cases where it does fix.
Under a strict liability standard, the firm, if found out, must pay a fine based on harm
caused, with no regard to the relative size of fixing costs and harm. Clearly, a purely
compensatory fine will not create the proper incentives for fixing, following investigation. That
is, if we only charge the firm for the harm it causes whenever we catch it, the firm will decide
whether to fix based on ch < Phh, which will in general mean that the firm will fix too
infrequently, as compared to (1). So let us immediately jump to a compensatory fine plus a
punitive component necessary to align fixing incentives. It is easy to see that the total fine Fh
(both compensatory and punitive elements) for harm h must be such that j3hFh=h. Here h itself
is the compensatory component of Fh, while the punitive component is Gh = = — h.
Ph
Turning now to the investigation decision, investigation imposes expected costs on the firm
of
[chdP + [0hFhdP. (5)
ch>/3hFh
Note that when the firm does not fix (ch > PhFh} it faces the probability ph that it will be fined.
When it does fix, there is no possibility of a fine, since by our simplifying assumption, the harm
is eliminated.
Not investigating imposed expected costs of
hdP- (6)
Note that the probability of being fined is lower in (6) than in (5) due to the fact that firm has not
investigated in (6). Combining (5) and (6), the firm investigates if and only if
* {lfi-c-dP-
Selectively substituting j3hFh = h yields
) j - c d P . (8)
ch>h ch<h
Term A Term B
We see that this criterion differs from society's investigation decision in (4) on two scores. Term
A in (8) concerns cases in which the harm would not be fixed if found. Its presence in (8) and
not in (4) reflects the fact that investigation exposes the firm to a higher probability of being
caught. This disincentive to investigation seems to be what firms themselves point to in arguing
for special treatment of environmental self-audits.
The second discrepancy in investigation criteria has received much less, if any, attention in
the popular press. This discrepancy, namely the difference between Term B in (8) and the right
hand side of (4), concerns harms which would be fixed once revealed by investigation. In these
cases the firm compares the cost of fixing ch to the expected fine conditional on not
investigating. The discrepancy arises because this expected fine is calculated using flh, the
probability of being caught having not investigated. Since the fine Fh was set so that phFh = /z, it
must be that J3 Fh<h and so the firm's net benefit from investigation in these cases falls short of
society's. This effect then, also weakens the incentive to investigate.
3.3 Conventional Negligence
As noted above, one of the problems of strict liability is that when the firm investigates but
chooses not to fix, its investigation increases the probability of getting caught, adding an
unwanted disincentive to investigation. If fixing incentives are properly aligned, this problem
only arises when it is best for the firm, as well as society, not to fix. Thus a negligence standard,
which only imposes fines in cases where society would have fixed, might be expected to align
public and private incentives to investigate. Recall though that there are two potential
discrepancies between the public and private incentives for investigation. While a negligence
standard does eliminate the discrepancy in incentives in the cases in which neither the firm nor
society would choose to fix, it fails to do so where the firm should and would fix.
To show this formally, we begin by defining the negligence standard. We set
i ifc><-h- CO
[0 if ch > h
By standard arguments, this negligence standard creates the proper incentives to fix having
investigated. If ch < h, the firm faces an expected fine of f3hFh = h if it fails to fix. Hence, it
fixes. If, on the other hand, ch > h, it faces no fine for not fixing and so does not fix.
Stepping back to the investigation decision, investigating yields expected costs of
chdP + jOdP . (10)
ch<h ch>h
not negligent
If the firm does not investigate, expected costs are
dP . (11)
cases where negligent




We see then that Term A from (8) has disappeared as noted above: since there are no fines for
investigating and then making the socially optimal decision not fix, the firm is not exposing itself
to a greater likelihood of getting caught in these cases. However, Term C in (12) is the same as
Term B in we (8) and so we face the same discrepancy between public and private investigation
incentives for harms which the firm would choose to fix.
3.4 Conditioning Fines on Investigation14
What sort of fine structure will completely align public and private incentives? A basic
intuition is generated through inspection of the discrepancies between the public and private
investigation criteria as laid above. Both the discrepancies that we identify (see Terms A and B
in (8)) arise because the firm faces different expected fines depending on whether or not it
investigates. This is due to the fact that investigation raises the probability of getting caught
10
from p to ph. But this can be counteracted by conditioning the fine itself on whether the firm
has investigated—in particular, by raising the fine in cases where it is less likely to be imposed.
In effect, the agency ends up rewarding the firm for having investigated: the firm is compensated
for having helped the agency discover the firm's own violations (through the fact that
investigation raises the probability of being caught).
The reader may ask: why should I believe that investigation is observable by the regulator?
But this is not the precise issue. The issue is whether the regulator knows of the investigation in
cases where the existence of that investigation helped it uncover the firm's noncompliance.15
Observability in these cases seems not only plausible, but logically required. If the agency's
observation is what causes the incentive problem in the first place, there can be no observability
issue in fixing that problem.
Our finding that the regulator should condition fines on investigation per se has interesting
implications for policy. As noted in the introduction, corporations and others point to increased
exposure to fine and liability as a strong disincentive to self-auditing. Policy solutions suggested
(and sometimes implemented) effectively reduce the punitive component of fines for violations
uncovered in self-auditing that are voluntarily disclosed and promptly corrected. Our proposal to
14
 The analysis in this section is done in the context of strict liability. A similar analysis applies to negligence.
15
 A more complicated model would allow for states of world in which the firm's investigation is only partially (if at
all) discovered and/or used by the regulator. By the same logic as in our model, the regulator can still alleviate the
disincentive to self-investigation by crediting the firm for the extent to which the agency has actually relied upon the
firm's self-investigation to catch the violation. Almost by definition, the agency can always observe the extent to
which the firm's investigation helped its own.
11
reduce fines is contingent only upon the agency's finding that there was investigation, regardless
of whether the findings are disclosed and/or corrected.16
Returning to the formal model, let Fh be the fine in the case in which the firm has
investigated and let Fh be the fine when the firm has not investigated. Set PhFh = PhLh~ h»
implying that Fh <Eh. Incentives to fix having investigated are then properly aligned as above.
The cost of investigating is
/+ [ckdP+ [fifidP. (13)
The cost of not investigating is
\ h d P . (14)
Combining yields the analogy to (7)
'+ [{pft-f^E^dPz [lhl>-chdP, (15)
PF
which since PhFh = ft F_h = h reduces to (4),i—h




 Note that in the EPA guidelines, fixing is always required for fine reduction, while our model depending on the
harm society may prefer not to fix (when the costs of correction exceed the cost of the harm). This difference may
reflect the long-standing mandate in Federal policy to not consider the costs of correction.
12
3.5 A Model of Voluntary Disclosure
Is it possible to reconcile our proposal in the previous subsection with EPA policy? In this
section we take a step toward answering that question by considering the case in which fines are
conditioned on the firm's disclosure of its investigation, rather than investigation itself. (Recall
that EPA conditions fine reduction on disclosure and correction). We find that conditioning on
disclosure can produce proper incentives, but we emphasize from the start three reasons why this
finding does not support the EPA approach.
First, conditioning on disclosure raises difficult issues of credibility: firms may have an
incentive to falsify or dissemble in reporting their results. Our mode of analysis here is to give
disclosure conditioning its "best chance" by assuming that information disclosed by the firm to
the agency is fully verifiable. Importantly, this will mean that the firm can not pretend to have
investigated, nor can it shade reports of investigation actually conducted.17
Secondly, the reason that disclosure conditioning can be effective is that it can be
manipulated in such a way that what is really being conditioned on is, once again, investigation
per se, as in our previous proposal. (The formal analysis below explains precisely how.)
Thirdly, our solution in this subsection conditions solely on disclosure and not also on
corrective action, as does actual EPA policy. The agency reduces fines for an admission of harm,
even when the firm has no intention of correcting that harm.
To make these points precise we modify our model slightly to account for the firm's
decision to disclose. Now, after having investigated, the firm chooses not only whether to
correct the harm but also whether to report the results of its investigation to the agency. As
13
noted, we assume that this report is verifiable, hence veritable. Thus, if the firm finds harm of h,
and decides to make disclosure to the agency, it is compelled to report" h." In particular, if it
has not investigated, it has nothing to disclose and so the disclosure choice, like the fixing
choice, arises only after investigation.18 We also assume that such disclosure imposes no direct
costs on the firm.
Since the issue here is the effect of conditioning on disclosure, we allow the agency to set
two fines: F / if the firm discloses harm h and FhN if the agency finds out on its own that the
harm is h. Importantly, the agency does not condition directly on investigation and so FhN is
assessed both in the case in which the firm has investigated, not fixed and not disclosed and the
case in which the firm has not investigated (and so neither fixed19 nor disclosed).
Proceeding backwards as in previous subsections, suppose that the firm has investigated. It
has four choices. It can 1) fix and disclose, 2) fix and not disclose, 3) not fix and disclose, or 4)
not fix and not disclose. Whether or not the firm discloses, fixing yields direct costs of ch (as
disclosure itself is costless). This handles alternatives 1) and 2). If the firm chooses alternative
3), not fixing but disclosing, the firm is fined Fhr. Finally, alternative 4), not fixing and not
disclosing results in an expected fine of f?hFhN .
In deciding whether to fix, the firm compares the uniform payoffs from fixing (i.e.
alternatives 1) and 2)) to the better of the payoffs from not fixing (i.e. alternatives 3) and 4). The
17
 Compare this observability issue to that in the previous subsection. There the (non)issue was whether the agency
could observe the extent to which the firm's investigation helped it uncover violations. Here the very real issue is
whether the agency can verify the truth of the firm's disclosure.
18
 Once again, we make this assumption not because we think it is plausible, but because the points we wish to make
about disclosure are sentences of the form, "even if disclosure is verifiable,..."
14
effective fine from not fixing is then the minimum of fines in 3) and 4) and the firm fixes if and
only if
ch<rmn{FhT,fihFhN} = mh (17)
Stepping backwards to the investigation decision, and making use of our definition of mh,
investigation imposes on the firm expected costs of
i + f chdP + \ mhdP, (18)
Jch<mh Jch»nh
while not investigating imposes costs of
Combining ,we see that the firm will investigate if and only if:
mh-/}FhNdP<\ PhFh"-chdP (20)
L>nu —» Jck<mk —"
Term D Term E
Once again our objective is to set the fines so that the firm's decision to investigate and fix
resembles society's. Aligning fixing incentives requires setting fines so that mh=h.
Investigation incentives are aligned as well if we also set p FhN = h, for then Term D disappears
and Term E resembles the right hand side of (4). Now, if mh and FhN were independent variables,
we could do this without further thought. However, mh depends in principal on FhN and our
analysis thus requires the additional step of showing that when J5 FhN = h, we can find a FhT so
19
 Recall our simplifying assumption that if the firm fixes the harm is alleviated and there is not fine. Recall also our
simplifying assumption that the firm can not fix if it has not investigated since it does not know the nature of the
harm.
15
that mh = min{Ff,fihFhN} = h. It turns out that F / = h does the trick: since fih > fih, setting
P FhN =h insures that j3hFhN > h and so FhT = h will be the minimum fine defining mh.
This is the arithmetic of the solution, but what is going on economically? Intuition is gained
by returning to the case of fines Fh conditioned on neither disclosure nor investigation, as in
subsection 3.2. There we faced the following difficulty: equating the expected fine conditional
on investigation with actual harm—in order to set proper post-investigation fixing incentives—
causes expected fines conditional on not investigating to fall short of what is necessary to align
investigation incentives. Now focus on the mirror image view of this same problem: setting the
fine to get the non investigation case right (setting J3 Fh=h) causes expected fines conditional
on having investigated to exceed the proper level (i.e., causes f5hFh >h). The benefit of
conditioning on disclosure is that it provides a way of fixing this overshoot in all cases in which
the firm has investigated. Essentially, the agency offers the firm who has investigated an "out:"
if the firm tells what it's found, the agency lowers the fine below what the firm expects to pay if
it keeps quiet. Of course, the firm prefers lower fines, and so always takes the option. In the
end, then, the firm faces a post-investigation fine F/ which is lower than that calculated with
Fh and the higher probability fih. In sum, our verifiability assumption insures that disclosure is
only possible when investigation has actually occurred. Conversely, lowering the fine for
disclosed violations insures that firms that investigate always disclose. The result is that
investigation and disclosure are effectively equated. Hence, the agency's "disclosure discount"
allows it to condition fines on investigation per se, which as we saw in subsection 3.4 is the key
to setting proper incentives.
16
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